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CYNTHIA V. WARD its continued social dominance. 4 Liberalism's cntlcs conclude that the achievement of social justice will be possible only when sameness-based conceptions of equality are rejected.5
Their argument launches two foundational attacks on liberal theory. First, the charge that liberalism "denies difference" is the primary means by which critical theorists contest liberalism's commitme nt to equality. Second, that charge appears to contradict the claim that liberal socie ties maximize "diversity" by allowing all individuals the largest possible quantity of freedom to live out their own particular visions of the good life. In response to critics like Young, for example, liberal theorist William Galston argues that "purposive liberalism ... comes closer than any other form of human association, past or present, to accommodating human differences. It is 'repressive' not in comparison with available alternatives but only in relation to unattainable fantasies of perfect liberation. "6 The legal and political outcomes of this dispute could be dramatic, for "difference" theorists translate their challenges to liberalism into reform proposals that could require substantial restructuring of liberal political and legal institutions. Martha Minow, for example, advocates a restructuring of rights in ways that would de-emphasize their autonomy-protecting function and instead help to preserve relationships and empathic, difference-respecting dialogue. 7 Sheila Foster claims that "we must establish institutional participatory patterns that accept and value the contributions 4. See, e.g. , Christine A. Littleton , Reconstrncting Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 , 1282 ("As a concep t, equality suffers from a 'mathematical fallacy'-lh al is, the view that only things that are the same can ever be equal"); Minow, Making all the DijJer-ence, supra note 2, at 149 ("Both the historical and heuristic versions of [Iiberall social contract theory claim to be inclusive, participatory, and egalitarian, yet both replicate the process of exclusion and subordination that preserves the two tracks of legal treaunent"); id. (noting that 'The U.S. Constitution l is ba~ed on liberal principles and ] is a document pcoduced t11rough an indisputably exclusionary process"); Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, su.pm note 2, at (claim ing that "politics of difkrence .. . promotes a notion of group solidar'ity against the individualism ofliberal humanism,"whi ch is characterized by an "assimi lation ist ideal" that sets facially neutral "norms" that in fact disadvantage oppressed groups).
5. Harris, .Jurisprudence oj Rewnst'YUction, supra note 2, at 76 1 (critical-rac e theorists advance an idea of "equality based not on sameness but on difference"; id. at 770 (critical-race theory attempts to refigure equality in ways beyond sameness a nd difTerence); Minow, When Difference Has Its Home, supra note 2, a t 113 (explaining main goal of article is to argue that "categorical approaches" to law. which attribute "difference" to different people, undermine commitments to equali ty); Minow, Making All the DijJerence, supra note 2, at 50, 74-75 (contesti ng idea of equality as samen ess); Young, Po/it), and Group Differenre, su.pra note 2, at 250-51. 18 (1980) (advocating "a liberal conception of equality that is compatible wi th a social order rich in diversity of talents, personal ideals, and forms of community"); Ronald Dworkin , TAKING RiGHTS SER10USLY 272-73 ( 1977) (defining "liberal conception of equality" as mandating that government "must not constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen 's co nception of the good life is nobler or superior to another's").
7. Minow, Making All the DifJerl!11.CI!, su.pra note 2. at 227-390 (defending he r vision of "rights in rela tionship").
of those d ifferences that have been left out."8 Scholars have argued th at properly accounting for racial "difference" imp lies the abolishment of Title VII and the re imagining of the law of employment discrimination and equal protection. 9 And Iris Marion Young proposes a "politics of diflerence " that would incorporate "a principle of representation for oppressed groups in democratic dec ision ma king bodies," as well as other group-based rights. lO In Part I of this Article I analyze the li beral value of dive rsity; in Parts II and IlI, I compare it with antiliberal conce p tions of difference; in Part IV, I evaluate the connection of "difference," as conceived by critics of liberal legalism, to the unde rl ying and (I argue) more fundamental value of equality.
"Difference" advocates advance their legal reform proposals in the name of true equality-equality grounded not in sameness but in difference." 1 conclude that, although equality can and should accommodate a wide range of d ifferenc es, these efforts to construct equality from difference eviscerate the concept of equality. To argue, as "difference " th eorists do, for the prioritization and celebration of equal ity base d on "d ifferen ce" is to argue against any found ational commitment to equali ty. To the extent it adds anything new to lega l discussion , "difference" theory is necessarily anliequality.
I. LIBERAL DIVERSITY
Liberal tend to speak of respecting "diversity" rather than "difference ," and this reflects more than a semantic disagree ment with their critics. 12 Differen(e?, 82 CAL L REV. 787. 804-44 ( 1994) .
10. Young, j ustice (md the Politics of Diff rrence, SlIpm note 2, <ll 15S. 11. See, e.g., Foster, D{[frrPnGe and Equali!.y , sulna note 2, <It 110-11 (exam ining concept of diversity und er "hybrid equality paradigm" and con cl uding th at " [l] O be useful in achieving th e goal of equality, a diversity ralionale should recogn ize th ose differences that have bee n construcled into a basis for, and have resulted in , systemic exclusion an d di sadvantage fo r individuals possessing th ose differences. "); id. al147-61 (affirming im porlance of equality goal an d advocating id ea lh al explicil recogniti on of soc ia ll y relevant difre rences is necessary lO achi eve il); Allan C. Ilutchi nso n, Identit), Cri.,,~<: The Politics of Interpretation, 26 NI' .\\' ENG. L. RH '. 1173, 1192 (1992) (on postmodern view of difTerence, "th e subjecl becomes a site for lhe conslant and continuing su'uggle to take on an identity thal is conducive to a u'uly egalitarian society"); id. at 1208 (,The triumph of a tru ly democratic politics wi ll only occu r when the author-mon arc h is finally dead and a polity o f t.ru ly qual readers and "'Titers is established and Ij,'ed"); Young, Polity and Group Dijfrrence, iltlna nOle 2, at251 ("the inclusion and participa tjon of everyone in public discussion an d decision making requires mechanisms for group re prese ntation "); Young, jltstice and the Politics o/Difference, mpm note 2, al 173 (assumin g lhal "(a I goal of soc ial justice . . . is soc ial equality," which "refers primarily to the fu ll participation and inclusion of everyone in a soc iety'S major institutions, a nd the socially su pported substantive opportu ni ty for all to develop and exercise th eir capacities an d realize th eir cho ices").
12. The term "diversity" is a lso ,,~dely employed to refer to efforts by p rivale a nd public entities to hire women and memhers of rac ial and ethnic minorit.ies. "Diversi ty" is thus a ideas have significantly dissimilar content, and in th e e nsuing discussion I examine and compare them.
A. Content of Liberal Diversity
Although they often fail to acknowledge it, contemporary "difference" theorists do not really attack liberalism per se, but only those versions of liberal thought that assume the presence of threshold levels of rationality, autonomy, and/ or age ncy in all human individuals and draw from this foundational assumption the political conclusion that equal, and individual , rights ought to form th e basis and the boundaries of the state. However, since autonomy-and rationali ty-based liberal th eo ri es a bound,13 such criticisms have potential powe r.
All students of liberalism are familiar with the slogan tha t a liberal state must allow each person the greatest possible freedom to pursue his or her vision of the good life. 14 This principl e derives directly from two underlying assumptions; first, that people are importantly the same, and therefore dese rve an equal opportunity to choose and direct th eir lives l 5; and second, that people are also importantly differe nt, which means that, given an equal description of a particula r justification for aflirmatjve actio n in hiring, a justification that focuses on th e benefits to the h iring organizations and/ or society at large 01' including within these organizations members of previously unrepresented, or underrepresented groups. This political meaning of diversity should be d istingui shed both from th e th eoretical claims of liberafism outlin ed above, and from t.he discussion below of difference theory. Indeed, the diversity ratio na le for am"mative action is para.'itie upon a socie ty's p,;or d ecisions as to what differe nce is and which d ifferences do, or should, ma t ter. See, e.g., F ost.er, DifJerenr.e and EqlU1.lil)\ supra note 2, a t 109 ("Diversity has been used as a code word for a variety of difTerences"); it/. at 111 ("th e current concept of diversity is 'empty' because it lacks a mediating principle. By U'eating all differen -es the same, it ignores the 'salience' o f ce rtain diffe rences in this ~ociety by extracting differences fro m their sociopol itical contexts").
13
. See, e.g., Ackerman, SIlpm note 6, at 182, 196 (explaining importance of a utonomy in liberaf theory); ill. a t 4-7 (ou tlining conceptio n of rational it)' th at forms basis for amhor's own brand of liberali sm); Rich ard H . Fal lon Jr., Two Senses oj Au/onomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875, 876 (1994) ("A view tracing to Kant majntains that o th er va lues possess their worth only because r<ltional, autonomous agents find them worth pursuing."); J ohn Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 515-16 (197 1) ("Foll owing tlle Kantian in terpretation of justice as fa irness, we can say that by acting from these principles [of justice] persons are acting autonomously: they are ac tin g from principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that best ex press their nature as free and rationaf beings ... . Thus, moral education is education for autonomy").
14. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 6, a t 54-55 (artic ul ating requi rement that liberaf principle of neutrality "does not distinguish the merits of competing concep tions of the Good ");
Gafston, supra note 6, at J 0 ("the libe t'al conception of the good . .. allows for a wide though not wholly un constrained pluralism among ways of life. It assumes th at ind ividuals have special (though not wholly unerring) insight into their own good . And it is consistent with the mini mization o fpubJi c resU'aints on indh~dllals "); Rawls, wpm no te 13, at 92-93 ("[AJ person's good is determined by what is for him Ihe most rational long-term plan of life . . . . To put it briefl y, tlle good is the satisfac tion of rationa l d esire").
15. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AtrrONOMY 3 1 (1988) ("Moral respect is owed to a.ll because a ll have tlle ca pacity for d efini ng tllemsclves").
chance to choose, their actual choices ,\~I\ vary 16 Because liberalism posits normatively that all people h ave equal moral worth, the em pirical fact of human differe nce ma nda tes respect for each pe rso n 's "right to be different" and to have his differences tolerated by o the rs.17
Three relevant conclusions follow from this. First, liberal diversity theo ry does not rely upon any particular account of the source of hum an dive rsi ty. By imply accepting human difference as a given and fitting respect for it within the ge neral rubric of liberal eq uality th ory, liberali m sid esteps continuing d ebates over the com parative responsibility of bi ology a nd social construction for human behavior a nd personality. The vel-sion of liberalism discussed here merely assum s that, what ver th sou rce and extent of difference, adult huma n beings possess at least some autonomous control over important life choices. III Second , in an important sense liberal diversity is a derivative value; that is, its normative status in liberal theory proceeds from the liberal's primary respect for th e equalily of individuals, a respect that when married to the e mpiri cal fact of hum an dilIere nces requires the libe ral to value diversity and to create the political condition of individual freedom through which to recogniz it. 19 Because humans are the same in certain ways, they must be given an equal cha nce to live their lives to the fullest; and beca use humans are also importantly different, a n equal chance mandates indi\~dual freedom and a respect for diversity_ Note that the strength of this diversity value can range, consist ot with this conclusion, fro m mere toleration to affirmative respe t an d admiration for difference. hat is, a liberal can consistently take eithe r the view that her own way of life is bes t but the different cho ices of oth ers must be accommodated because, as indi~dual s possessi ng 16. See, e. g., John Stuart Mill , ON Ll BER't"Y: ANNOTATED TE:XT, SOURCES. AN D BACKGROUND CRITICISM 65 (David Spitz ed. 1975 ) ("Such are the differences am ong human bein gs in the ir sources of pleasure, their susceptibiliti es of pain , and the ope ra tion on th em of different physical and mora l agencics, that unl ess thcre is a corresponding diversi ly in their modes of life, they neither obtain thcir fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the me n tal, moral, and aesthetic statu re o f which the ir nature is ca pablc·'); Robert Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE. AND UTOPIA 308-{)9 ( 1974) (discussing ex tensive d iversity of human beings); Amartya Sen, IN-EQ AUTY REEXAM INED 19-21 (1992) (discussing impact of "extensive human d iversi ty" on equality theory) .
.17. See, e.g., Michel Ro enfelrl , Substantive Equa.tily and Equal Opportunity: 1\ j utlspnuilmlial Appraisal, 74 C"" .. L. REv. 1687, 1702 (" In its broadest terms, then , eq ual iti es must be co nstructed so that those who are different are nOt .-egarded as in feriors, and con fo rming iden tities are nOt imposed upon them .. J.
18. .'iee, e.g. , Fa llo n, supra notc 13, at 887-88 (defendin g conception of descriptive au tonomy an d noti ng tha t "lh e self, th ough sil.Uated and socially COnStilu t.ed, remains capable of apprcciating her situated condition, of assessing and cri ti cizing her assump tions and values, and of re\~sing her goal and commitm ents .... The self is a creal.Ure ill and of th e world, but one capable of at leasl partially transformi ng herself through though t, cri ticism, and self-interpretation").
19. See Sen, StljJra note 16, at 12-16 (noting that "every normative theory of soc ial arrangement lhat has at a ll slood the lest of lime seems to dem and equality of sOlllethi71g--someth ing tha t is regarded as part.ic ularly important in that theor y," and th us that "th e battle is nOl, in an important sense, about 'why eq ua lity?' , but aboul 'eq uali ty of what?'"). autonomy, agency, or whatever, they have the right to be wrong, or the view that there are many equally valuable "visions of the good life," and that she should therefore be encouraging to, and welcoming of, visions that differ from her own. Both approaches assume a value for diversity that follows coherently from a liberal understanding of equal respect for individual personhood.
Third, liberal equality serves as both the value that grounds respect for diversity and as the boundary to diversity. One's right to pursue one's own vision of life, which derives from the liberal's equal respect for all people, is simultaneously limited by the equal right of everyone else to do the same. "To each his own" is a liberal sentiment that does not apply to persons whose vision of self-maximization requires the murder or torture of others.
In short, liberal respect for diversity is both derivative of, and subservient to, the foundational liberal value of (sameness-based) equality. Ov r time, however, the exact relationship betvveen these tvvo values has shifted, driving liberalism toward visions of equality that h av continued to embrace foundational sameness but have also increasingly acknowledged the profundity of human difference.
B. Diversity and Liberal Equalities
It is important to distinguish betvveen tvvo relevant meanings of equality. The first refers to equality as a distributive principle, as a particular means of implementing a deeper equality ideal-via libertarian "equal rights,"20 or equal distribution of resources,21 or of primary goods,22 etc. At this level the argument is not over whether human beings are the same (and therefore equal) in some descriptive sense, but ov r which form of egalitarian distribution of resources will best serve an already accepted equality premise. 23 The second meaning of equality refers to the just~fication of political and legal egalitarianism, advancing an answer to the question , Why should we arrange society and law so as to guarantee equal distribution of ----resource (s) ?24 20. See, e.g., id . at 22 ("Libertarian demands for liberty typically include important featmes of 'equal liberty,' e.g., the insistence on equal immu ni ty from interference by othel·s"). EQUALHY2 (1980) . 24. Amartya Sen, supra note 16, at 12-30, discusses these two ideas, noting that "[ tlwo central issues for ethical analysis of equality are: (1) Why equality? (2) Equality of What?" Discussing the work of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin notes a similar differen ce between Rawls's two conceptions of equality, which consist of claims with respect to the disu'ibution of goods, and claims to equal concern and respect for all individuals, Dworkin, sul,ra note 6, at 180-82.
The con n ection ben.\'een these two meanings of equality has changed significantly within liberal theory. According to its now-standa rd tale, liberalism's earli est vision of egalitarianism found its legal expres ion in the view that individuals have "equa l rights." This vision of legal equality, also characterized by the phrases "equal treatment" and "formal equality," interpreted equal righ ts to mandate ide ntical treatm ent, resulting in the principle that th e law may not treat similarly situated persons differently.25
The legal princi ple of equal treatment begins from a justification of equality that relies on some sh ared trait-some "same ness"-among all hum ans (for example, a utonomy, age ncy, capacity to have a vision of the good life and ac t upon it, or capaci ty for "moral personality"), and proceeds mechanically to import this "sameness" justification into the legal and poli ti al spheres via the principle of "equal rights." Equal treatment is based on the idea that, b cause people are (in relevant ways) the'ame, the law should treat them the same.
Although fundamental samen ess has re mained the core ju tification of liberal equality, the same ness-based egalita rian principle has been succeeded by a myriad of reformul ations of the m eaning of legal a nd political egalitarianism, among wh ich (Ire the closely related principles of "equal concern, "26 "equal a ep ta n ce,"~7 and "equal opportunity. "28 These principles began to open a divide betwee n th e samen ess-based justification for legal equality and the proper means of imp Ie men Ling it. They sought legally to express the view that lib rallaw ho uld e ndorse different treatment for diffe rent pe rsons in the service of the unde rlying principle that people are, in the relevant libe ral senses, the same. Progressive liberal theodsts argued that treating everyone the same necessarily e rased important a nd relevant differences among them. Altho ug h humans share a uton o my, they aJso have differen ces that make treatment "as a n equal" in consi sten t with identical treatment. 29 Two things are important about this. First, th e progression of liberalism discussed above worked a sig nificant cha nge in the re lationship between equality and diversity within the li beral framework. Equal treatment was found in adeq uate as a legal principle precisely beca use it was in fundamental tension with diversity, and libe ral philosophers concluded that treating people the same took insufficient account of th eir diffe rences and was therefore a viol.al.ion of liberal equali ty prope rly co nceived.
Second, the liberal progression from e qual treatment to a mandate of "treatment as equals" allered the relationship betwee n equality as justitica- tion and equality as a di tributiv principle. The changes within lib ralism have d monstrated that a sameness-based justification of equaliLy doe not necessarily imply egalitarian tr atment, but can mandate different treatment for those with sp cial ne ds JIO Thus, critical attacks on liberalism for advocating equality based on ~sa m eness" do not inherently engag liberal distributive principles-which are now fully compatible with the id a of different treatment. The attacks must therefore addres only the liberal justification that those distributiv principles grow out of some basic samen ss-rationality, autonomy, or whatever-shar d by humans as humans.
It is true that justifications of liberal prin iples of I gal equality, even in th ir progressiv modes, are ultimately grounded in descriptive assumptions of human sameness. Asked why peopl should be "treated as equals" legally, the liberal replies by articulating some common faculty related to th capacity of persons for agency, autonomy, rationality. or a variant that justifies whatever v rsion of political and legal equali ty the liberal finds appropriat . The move from "equal treatment" to "treatment as equals" simply break the symmetrical connection between equality as justification-the desCliptive sense in which all humans are the same-and political-legal egalitarianism, which has moved from being grounded in sameness to th acknowledgment of difference. The failure to recognize certain differ nces has become a failure to treat all people as equals. Thu , a contemporary liberal society can justify the expenditur of public funds to construct sp cial sidewalk and building ramps for the physically disabled. although this involves treating disabled persons differently from the nondisabled, on the principle that the disabled, as equal per ons in the sen e relevant to such access, deserve " qual concern and respect," which in turn commands equ al access to the public sphere. And lib ral feminists have argued that equal access can mean different treatment-such as special workplace accommodation for pregnant women 31 -that is nevertheless grounded in women 's fundamental sameness to men.
30, Other forms of Iiberalism-e,g" u ti li tarian ones--demunstra,e that egal itarian treatment does not require descriptive same ne.ss a, its base. A liberal utilitarian might simply assert that eq ual respect for th e rights and freedoms of individuals-the idea that each coun ts for one, and no more than o ne-maximizes utili ty, however thaL function is defined, (But why does it do so? ' Why does treating people equally maximize utility? B cause humans g >nerally have a preference to be treated equally? If so, is that in itself, or is the capacit), to experi ence happiness or uffering, an indication of some fundamental same ness? Since a "yes'· answer to that que tion would simply fold utilitaIianism into the general argument of this es ay, while a "no" answer leaves the argument untouched , I wi ll put aside u til itariani sm for the mome n t. Bu.t see infm, text accompanying note 150, 31. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 28, at 22 (proposi ng "e pisodi c analysis" that would "ta ke acco unt of biologi al reproductive sex d ifferences and treat them as legally significant only when they ar being u til ized fo r reproductive purposes. "); id, at 27 ("in order to maintain the woman 's equality of opportunity during her pregnancy, we should modify as far as reasonably possible those aspects of ber work where her job performance is adversely affected by th e pregnan cy, Still, even in its contem porary form diversity remains subservi nt to equality within liberalism-a fact that motivated the liberal civil-rights movement. Implied in the liberal convictions th at equality is a valu more basic than dive rsity, and th a t persons are equal b cause they ha re certain threshold capa ities, i th notion th at differences among hum a ns may not be used to undermine 1 gal equali ty. Indeed, for a liberal, history teaches the dangers of over-focusi ng on diffe rences. Liberals are alert, for exam ple, to th e huma n prope nsity to falsely a sume fundamental difference in the character, int lIigence, or p rsonali ty o f oth ers based on immutable characteristics such as skin a lar, ge nd r, or physical ha ndicap, which are in fact unrelated to the moral worth of p rsons. Lib rals h ave attempted to see through su h differenc s to the esse ntial hum a ni ty32 of (for example) wom e n, racial minorities, a nd h a ndi capped p rsons.
In short, large groups of people, including racial minorities, women, and the handicapped, have in the past been miscategorized as infe rior, when differences betvvee n the m and the majority have either been inven ted or translated into justifications for ignoring their claim to equal personhood . Th e history of lib ralism d emonstrates that these miscategorizations can be corrected via th a rgument tha t such gro ups of persons share the basic samenesses that justify treatm n t as equals under liberal law.
In an important e n e, liberali m 's cri tic atte mpt to reverse the liberal relation hip betw n equality a nd diversity. ' \o\T hile libe rals treat cliversity as subservien t to, a nd dependent upon, equality, critics of liberalism reject the id a that equality can or should be ba ed on an a sumption of ameness among all persons and em phasize instead the irreducible importance of human ditference. 33
II. ESSENTIALIST DIFFERENCE

A. Sameness as Domination
At the heart of rna t theoretical a ttacks on "liberal I galism " is the claim tha t, contrary to th eir xpr ss co mmitm nts, libe ral institutions are mainUnless we do so, she will e pelience employme n t disadva n tages arisin g from her reproduc6ve activity Ulat are nOt e ncou ntered by her mal e 'o-worke r"); ill. (episodic analysis ~wi ll enable rJle law to trea t women differe ntly than men during a lim ited period when their need s may be grea ter than th ose of men as a way of ensu ring that women will be equal to men with respect to their overall enlploymel1l o pportunities"); Littleton . sup-ra no te 4, at 1283 (argu in g that "eq uality an be ... reconstructed as a mea ns of chall engin g, rather tlla n legiti mating, social insti tutions crea ted from th e phallocentri pe rspective."); id. at 1284 (adva ncin g notion of equality as accep tance and averring that "[tlo achi ve this form o f sexual equality, male an d female 'differen 'es' must be costle 's relative to eac h oUler").
32. ubddined as rational ily. capacity for moral personality, agency, Ctc. 33. Mino\\', Making Aillhe Difference, .m/ml. note 2. at 146-47.
tained by and for a white male elite that hides its domination of society be hind e mpty claims to respect the equal moral worth of all persons.~4 Of course, the critics do not need to claim that liberalism suppresses all diffe rence; they co uld even acknowledge that, within the constraints of its core assumptions about human n ature-assumptions th at justifY its view of equality-liberal theory allows the flourishing of many visions of the good life. 35 It is those constrain ts, howev r, that radical dirrerence th eorists target as parochial and highly restri ctive. 36 Indeed, according to this view the libe ral's boun ded respect for "diversity" actually suppresses the acknowledgme nt of fundamenta l "differe nce."
B. The Relational " Different Voi ce"
Reduced to its core components, th e attack on liberal diversit)1 makes two claims. Critics charge first that lib ralism mi sdescribes human nature by assuming and celebra ting individual autonomy and choi c while simultanously excluding from law and politics important parts of the self such as its interde pe nde nce and/ or relational capac ity37; and second, that those ig- .. has a mythological or fairY-La le quality"); Harris, j 'lllispmd,mce oj Ummstru.f/hm, supra note 2, a l 7.'l4 (cri lical-race theory "PUI)' law's supposed objectivity an d neutrali ty o n trial, argui ng th at whal look. like race-neu udlity on the sut'fact: has a deeper structure th al rdlecLS white privilege. "); ill. at 759 ("Histor)' has shown that racism can coexist happi ly with formal commitments to obj ectivity, neutrahty, and colorblindness"); Catharine MacKinnon , TOWARD A FE. \.fINIST T II EO RY OF THE STATE 220-2 1 (1989) (liberal conce ption o f eq uality as empl oyed in sex d iscrintimlljon law conceals "the substa ntive way in whic h man has become the mea 'ure of all things); id. ~t 224 ("Men 's physiology defines most SPOrtS, th eir h ea lth needs larg-e ly d efin e insuranc!: c(}wrage, their socially d esigned biographies define workplace expectati ons and successful career patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality in sch olarship, th ei r experienct:s ,md obsessions define merit, thei r militar y service defines citizenship, the ir presence defines fami ly. thei r inabi li ty to get along \\~th each o ther-th eir wars and rulerships-defines h isLOry, th t:ir itttage defines god , and their ge ni tals define sex. These arc the standards that are presented as gender n eutral"); Youn g, justiCl ' and thp Politics oJDiJJPTmrr, mpm note 2, at 168-69 (arguing that liberal quality tJleory has effect of excl uding those labeled "differen t"); irl. at 173 ("policies th at are u niversally form ul ated and thus blin d to differences of race, culturt:, ge nder, age, or disability often perpetuate rather [han undennin e oppre sion " Politics vJ Di[[erI'11(1', supra note 2, at 173 ("Policies that are universally formulated and thus blind to differe nces of race, culture, gender, age, or disabili ty often perpetuate rather than underminc oppression").
37. Commu ni tarians have been especially kecn on tJlis attack. ,yp f(Plll'mlly Michael Sandel , LIBERALlS~t AND Til E LI MITS OF J USTICE (1982) . nored parts of th e self should be both celebrated and incorporated into our legal institutions. 38 Accord ing to some critical scholars, the liberal focus on individual autonomy, while val idly descriptive of certain groups, obscures or suppresses other, equally worthy visions of the good that emphasize the primary importance of relational ability and connectedness. This suppression, they charge, has the effect in liberal societies of excluding from legal identity groups that hold more communitarian worldviews. Much relational feminist work takes this approach, arguing, in the well-known words of Carol Gilligan, for the inclusion of women's "different voice "39 into morallegitimacy and legal in stitutions. 4o
The normative implications of this relational critique of liberalism are clear: "liberal legalis m " should either be supplemented with a legal system that recognizes relevant ch aracteristics, such as relational capacity, that lib ral law currently ignores,4) or liberal institutions should be replaced altogether by a system of communitarian deliberation that celebrates more important features and ideals of human society.42
See f?1erally
Su~an na Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Co-lI.5titutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. ReV. 543 (1986) (citing Carol Gilligan and arguing for inclusion of women's "different voice" into law); West, supra note 1 (arguing that law must incorporate women's focus on co nnected ness as well as men's concern with individual autonomy).
39. Carol Gilli gan, IN A OIFFE. R£NT VOI CE (1980) .
For relational fem inist discussions that use
Gillig-an 's ideas to criticae liberal law, see, e.g., West, supra nOle I , at 2-4, 14-26,42 (1988) (defending the "connec tion tllesis"-that women differ essen tially from men because they are materially con nected to other human lives through L11e malernal experien ce and therefore value connection and nurturing over au tonomy); Sherry, supra nOle 38, at 543, 579-84 (hypothesizing that women 's concerns about connection, subjectivity, an d responsibility for others accord well with communitarian legal structures while men's emphasis on autonomy, obj ectivity, and rights translates into liberalism) . For a similar thesi ' in the context of race relations, see, e.g., J acinda T. Townsend,
(1995) ("The Black community maintai ns its own set of family values, including collective responsibility, se lf~e le rmination, and cooperative economics. T hese values help define a communi tarian Black so iely thal can be ontrasted with an individual rights based dominant society").
CaLllarine MacKinnon, a cri tic of relational feminism, might nevertheless be placed in this camp as she also appears to assume that although liberal auto nomy and the liberal state work well for men, they oppress wom en; see, e.g., MacKinnon , supra note 34, at 157-70, 237-49 (1989) For these relational CritiCS , recognizing the importance of "ditlerence" per se is not really a fundamental goal at all; for th m, a "diffe rence" argument serves merely as a stalking horse for the endorsement of a specific vision of the good that is allegedly suppress d by liberal legalism. Either this vi ion should supple ment liberalism , for a ne t gain of one "voice" in the law, or it should entirely replace liberalism, for a ne t gain of zero. Their call is not to maximize the number of visions of the good held in society or to celebrate "difference" in the abstract, but to claim recognition for their particular re lational vision. In other words, were it irrefutably shown to these theorists that their plans for reform would shrink the range of p ermissible visions of the good (by, for example, eliminating all those that h ave result d from the endorsem nt of liberalism in it curre nt form ), they might well be indiffere nt.
But if this is all that is meant by calls for the fuller acknowledgement of "difference" then there is no n eed to use th e concept a t all. We should simply proceed to evaluate the substantive visions of the good advanced by ditlerence advocat s and decide which of them (if any) to adopt.
III. DIFFERENCE AS INEQUALITY
A second line of attack on liberal diversity de ni es even the possibili ty of individual autonomy as liberals conceive it. According to this argument, which grounds much critique of liberalism from postffiodern 43 ~ minists and critical-race th orists, liberal autonomy is a false construct that incorrectly assumes the presence and uncoerced choice-making powe r of a unified individual self that in fact does not exist. 44 Advocates of this seco nd \~ew attack liberalism by attempting to destabilize or "deconstruct" ideas such as autonomy and individual seUhood. Such schclars also attack the relational critics of liberalism for relying on falsely "essen-43. The term 'postmodern" can mean many things, and I use it somewhat loosely in th is anicle. Angela Harris has described the usc of this term in jurisprudential literature: "[Post· modernism] suggest(sl th at wha t has been presented in our social-political and o ur intelleclLIal traditions as knowledge, trlllh, o bjectivity, and reason are actually merely the eITe "ts of a particular form of social power, the victory of a particul ar way of represe nting the world tha t then presents itself as beyond mere in terpretation , as truth itself." Harris, supra no te 2, at 748.
44.
See, e.g. , Hutchi nson , supra note 11, at 11 84-85 (" Rather than thin k of th e su bject as a uni tary and sovereign subject whose sell<.] irec ted vocation is to bring the world to heel th rough the exacting discipline of rational inquiry, pos\JTIoderni5m interrogates the whole idea of autonomo us subj ec tivi ty and absu-ac t r<;asol1; it places th em in a constan tly con tingent condi· tion of provisionali ty"); id. at 11 92 ("posl.mode rni sts suggest that the tr-aditional notion of authenticity-' to thine own self be true '-is an immediate patienl for postmodern surgery"); Young, TIU' Ideal oj r'()l1wl'Iln il)l supra note 2, at 300,310 ("The idea ortlle self as a unified subjec t of desire and need and an origi n of assertion a nd action has been powerfully 'ail ed in to qu estion by contemporar y philosophers") ; id. a t 308-09 (criticizin g liberal onception of moral autonomy).
tiali t" categories to describe, for xample, the differences b tween men and worn nY' They criticize relational theorists for associating the "male," or white majority, with lib ral autonomy and the "fe male," or racial minority, with nurturing and community, and then using this supposedly inh rent opposition to argue for the legal recognition of marginalized groups into law via communitarian reform of liberalism. 46 Antiessentialist scholars charge that such efforts to define, for example, a "true female self' or a "true male self' deny the full range of human difference. 47 In th ir critiqu of both liberal div rsity and relational views, postrnodern difference theorists promote alternatives to liberal individualism that are grounded in the cel bration of difference itself. 48 To remain internally consistent, su h th eories must rely upon some nonessentialist understanding of persons for th charge that liberalism "d nies difference"49 and the attendant call for fuller recognition of this concept.
A. Antiessential ist Difference
How is the liberal vision of "diversity" distinct from the concept of "difference" employed by liberalism's antiessentialist critics? The latter incor-45. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Gcruier T1 'Olible, Fc'nini.st 77zeory, and Psyclwan(llytic Di5couTsc, in FlMINISM/ POSTMODERNISM 324, 338-39 (Linda J. Nichol on cd., 1990) ("Inasmuch a the construct of women presupposes a specificity an d coherence that differenti ates it from that of men, lhe categories of gender appear as an unproblematic point of deparl.ll,·e for feminist politics. But if . .. 'sex' itself is a category produced in the in te reSL~ of the hetero exual contract, or if we consider Foucaulr's suggestion l.hal . ex' desigr,ates an artificial unily thal works to maintain and amplifY the regulation ofsexuality\\~thin the reproductive domain , the n it seems that gender coherence operates in much the same way, not as a ground of politics bul. REv. 797 (1989) . For criticisms of feminist essentialism, see gl'llerally Harris, ,,"pm notc 40; Elizabetl1 Spelman, INESSENTIAl. WOMAN (1988) . Criticism of relational feminist essentialism comes not on ly from postmodern scholars but also from liberal and radical feminists. Se.e, e.g., J ean Ham pt.on, Feminist Contmetan:· anism, in AMI D OF 0 E'S OWN: Ff;MINI$T EsSA\S ON REAsON AND OBJECfMTY 227,231 (1993) (In the results of Gilligan's research showing that boys are more autonomous while girls are morc caring. "I hear the voice of a child who is preparing to be a member of a dominating group and th e voice of another who is preparing to be a member of the group that i dominated"); Mac Kinnon , 5u/Jm note 40, at 38-39 (criticizing relational feminists for valuing as essentially feminine charactelistics, such as nurturing and care, that are the result of male domination).
47. See, e.g., H.uri ,supra nOle 40, at -85 (arguing Ihal resull of "gender esse ntialism " is "not on ly thal some voices are silenc d in order to privilege olhers ... but t11 a lthc voices that are si lenc d turn OLIl to be th e same voices silenced by the mainstream legal voice of We the People-among them, Ih e voices of black women").
48. See, e.g., Minow, Mohillg All. the Difference, . HI. pm nOte 2, at 3-4 (raising \Vordes about the process of categorization thal resulis in the onclusion of difference).
49. Young, Tlte Idnd o/Community, mpra note 2, at 307.
porates five fundamental themes. First, differences between people-as least insofar as they have social consequences-are results of social construction, not biological or freely chosen phenomena. 5o Se ond, the social assignment of the label "different" to some groups, and the elevation of that difference to political and/ or legal significance, is an exercise of power by majorities or elite over the persons or groups so labeled. 51 Difference is both the product of, and guarantor of, the continued subordination of powerless groups. A corollary is that the naming and norming process themselves help to create persons who exemplify the difference named. 52 Third, it is impossible to transcend difference in favor of any objective "truth" about it, since each person is trapped within his REv. 503,505 (1994) ("The postmodern critique of liberal explanations of the se lf posits that culture, not human nature, gives humans their sexual OIientations"); Harris, supra note 2, at 762 (discussing the postmodern "problem of the subject" and claiming that "( t)he language of race creates, maintains, and destroys subjects, both inside and outside the law"); id. at 784 ("Racial communities, like other human communities, are the products of invention, not discovery") ; Hutchinson, supra note 11 , at 1192 ("The subject is a cultural creation, not a biological given"); Hutchinson, Inessentially SPeaking (/.\' There Politics Ajler Posttllodernis'/1!~), 89 MICH. L. R EV. 1549, 1552 (1991) (book review of Martha Min ow, Making AU the Difference) ("The postmodern temper has no eternal truth to offer and no immutable knowledge to dispense; it accepts the historically situated and socially constructed character of truths and knowledges"); id. at 1564 ("Differences are culturally imposed and socially policed "); Minow, Making All the Difference, supra note 2, at 19-23 (discussing social construction of difference in context of the "diITerence dilemmas" it produces). 5 1. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 45, at 326 (construction of the autonomous subject requires domination and oppression); Hutchinson, supra note 50, at 1563 ("Domination has been perpetuated and rationalized both by embracing difference (superiority of men over women and white-skinned people over black-skinned people) and by eschewing difference (o-ea unent of women as men and African Americans as white Europeans). These are the advantages that have made the establishment of power overwhelmingly white and male "); Minow, Making AU the Difference, supra note 2, at 50 (criticizing linkage in law between "difference" and "deviance"); id. at 53 ("Assertions of a difference as 'the truth ' may indeed obscure the power of the person attributing the diITerence wh il e excluding important competing perspectives. Differen 'e is a clue to the social arrangements that make some people less accepted and less integrated while expressing the needs and interests of others who constitute the presumed model").
52. Harris, supr" note 2, at 762 ("The language of race creates, maintains, and destroys subjects, both inside and o u tside the law"); Hutchinson, supra note 50, at 1554 ("The process of labeling and naming is particularly fraught with dangers when it concerns people. To categorize is to choose, and, in so doing, there is no escaping the responsibility of judgment or its context of power") ; Minow, Makillg Ali the Difference, supra note 2, at 174-77 (identifying labeling theory as antecedent to her social relations approach, and explaining that "labeli ng theory studies the process by which an audience or commu ni ty identifies some people as deviants. That very pattern of identification has consequences for the labeled person which are difficult to escape. Those consequences include recurring patterns of exclusion and deviant behavior. Labeling theory thus treats difference as an idea developed by some people to describe others and to attri bute meaning to others' behavior") .
or her own individual reality. 53 Fourth, the fact that difference is socially constructed rather than "natural" or intrinsic opens up the possibility of changing it and reforming society.54 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we should worry about the hierarchical deployment of difference labels because only in doing so will we transcend liberal sameness-based equality55 and achieve real equality.56
Martha Minow's "Difference Dilemmas"
Professor Martha Minow's scholarship offers the richest discussion of this view of difference as applied to law, and for that reason it merits close scrutiny here. 57 In her book, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law,58 Professor Minow criticizes American-style Jiberallegalism for reinforcing socially created difference through its reliance on five false assumptions. 59 First, legal categories reinforce the invidious idea that '''differences' are intrinsic, rather than viewing them as expressions of comparisons bet\veen people on the basis of particular traits." T his assumption results in the assignment of the burden of difference to the person deemed "different" rather than to society at large. Thus, a deaf child in a 53. Ser, e.g., Hutchi nson, supra note 50, at 1565 ("Although people are never nOl in a local context, they are never in a contex t that is not open to conti ngent revision"); id. at 1570 ("Wh il e persons are not red ucible to their autobiographies, they never fully escape them; they forge their identities through the existential tension between confronting or confounding their autobiographies"); Hutchinson , supra note II , at 1187 ("Embedded in a constitute discourse of power, readers are also disciplined by the eXlarH protocols of power -th ey are subjects in transition"); Minow, Making ali lhe Difference, supra note 2, at 53 ("There is no single, superior perspective for judging questions of difference. No perspective asserted to produce ·the truth' is without a situated per pective, because any statemem is made by a person who has a perspective").
54. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra nOle 11, at 1209 ("In the face of the problematized subject, postmodemism does not capitulate to or retreat from the task of struggli ng towards an enhanced social solidarity and experien ce of justice. The hope is to em power su bjects by making them individually aware of their capacity for self (re)creation and collectively responsible for establishing a mode of social life that mu ltiplies Ule opportunities lor transformative action "); Minow. Making AlllllI! Differt'nce, SUP'I'(I note 2, at 53 ("DiITerence is a clue to the social arrangements that make some people less accepted and less integrated while expressing the needs and interests of others who constitute the presumed model. And social arrangemenL~ can be changed. An-angements thal assign the burden of "differences" to some people while making others comfortable are histori cal artifaCt •. Maintaining these historical patterns embedded in the status quo is not neutral and cannot be justified by the claim that everyone has freely chosen to do so").
55 classroom of hearing children is deemed "differ nt" from the others and treated separately by law as a result of that differen e. 6 (J Second, this legal proces of difference labeling illegitimately a sume certain "norms" from th standpoint of which it dee ms some persons "different": ''The hearing-impaired student is differ nt in omparison to the norm of the hearing stud l1l-yet the hearing student differs from the hearing-impaired tudent as much as she differs from him . .. . "6 1 For Minow, this "norming" proce s is problematic becau 'e " [ u] nstated points of r ference may express the xperi nee of a majority or may e, pI' ss the perspective of those who have had gr ater access to th e power used in naming and assessing others." The relatively powerless may suffer under judgments of inferiority that result from this biased process of namin g and norming. 62 Minow offers many legally reI vant examples of this ritique of legal categories, including the exclusionary labeling as "different" of disabled persons, of stud nts whose first language is not Engli h, of racial minorities, of gays and lesbians, of women, and of religious minoriti S.63 In each case, Minow aver, some norm-of "abl ness," or English speak ing, or whiteness, or mal nes ', or heterosexuality-has been used to justify treating as different and inferior those who fail to omply with the norm.u4
Third, the law falsdy assumes that those who perfo rm these naming and norming actions are themselves neutral, without a per peCliv .65 Differences are assumed to be objective, observable, and capable of legal categorization, reflecting the law's "aspiration to impartiali ty," an "aspiration [that] risks obscuring the inevitable perspec tive of any given legal official ... and thereby makes it harder to challenge the impact of perspective on the selection of u"aits used to judge legal consequences." The op ration of the myth of impartiality, Minow contends, is illustrated by the defendant in an employment case who urged Judge Constance Baker Motley to disqualify herself from the case "because she, as a black woman who had once 176 (1982) , involving dispute benveen Rowleys and Board of EducaLion over whether federal law emi tled the Rowleys' hearing-impaired child, Amy, to a sign-language interpreter in all her cia ses, or whether the school's educational plan , which supplemented Amy"> expe ri ence in "mainstream" classroom with special tutoring, saLisfied the law). Minow nOtes, id. at 82, that "[b)oth sid s [in the case) assumed that the problem was Amy'S: because she was difIerem fi'oll1 other stlldents, the solution must focus on her. Both sides deployed the unstated nOrm of the hearing studelll who receives educational input [rom a [cacheI' , rather than im agini ng a different. norm around which the enLire classroom might be co nstrIlCled. ... all of them were attorney , of a S x, often with di tingul hed law firm or public ervice backgrounds. "67 Fourth, the per pective of tho being labeled "differ nt" is either ignor d outright or assumed to have b el accounted for by thos who create and maintain th particular norm in question. 58 Thus, many legal observers have viewed aflirmative action as nonneutral, compared with status quo u'eatments of race and gender in employment and other disu'ibution s of societal resources. Proposals to alter rules about gender roles encounter objections, from both men and women , to what is seen as undesirable disruption in the expectations and predictability of social relationships.
uggestions to in tegrate schools, private clubs, and other social institutions . .. provoke protests that these changes would interfere with freedomreferring, often expli itly, to the freedom of those who do not wish to associate with certain oth rs.69
Fifth, these legal and social practices reinforce the false assumption that our xisting institutional arrang ments are natural, neutral, and therefore inevitable. 7o Minowargue that the root problem with this way of handling difference is that it creates and perpetuates inequality: ''Buried in the questions about difference are assumptions that difference is linked to stigma or deviance and that sameness is a prerequisite for equal ity."7 I On her view " [d] iffernce is relational, not intrinsic,"72 because "[wJho or what hould be taken as the pain t of reference for d fining differences is debatabl ." From the viewpoint of the m~jority a person in a wheelchair is "handicapped"; from that person's perspective the majority may be termed 'Temporarily ble Persons." Whose point of view should serve as the anchor of law is a question that must be discussed rather than buried.7 3 related assumption is that " [t] here is no single, superior perspective for judging questions of difference. No persp ctive asserted to produc ' the truth' is without a situated perspective, because any statement is made by a person who has a perspective. "71 Assignments of difference are social decisions that reflect, and therefore offer a chance to explore, the structure of power and hierarchy in society, to reveal its plasticity, and thereby to empower ourselves to change it. 75 Minow claims lhat the assumptions about difference that underly our law result in apparently unsolvable "difference dilemmas, " presenting equality advocates with a choice between acknowledgin g certain differences, such as handicaps, race, or gender, via "special treatment" programs that may simultaneously reinforce th stigma attached to the difference, or ignoring the difference altogether, which can itself make the difl'erence continue to matter given underlying social inequality.7 6 Thus, with respect to race-and gender-conscious affirmative action programs, the "dilemma of difference" involves questions of how to avoid the stigma traditionally attached to race and gender while trying legally to remedy the wrongs done by labeling women and minorities as both different and inferior. As Minow phrases it: "How can historical discrimination on the basis of race and gender be overcome if the remedies themselves use the forbidden categories of race and gender? Yet without such remedies, how can historical discrimination and its legacies of segregation and exclusion be transcended?"77
It follows that solving the difference problem is not simply a matter of either ignoring difference or openly accommodating it, as both methodologies result in serious problems for groups that have been disadvantaged by treatmen t as "differ n t. "78 Minow urges the questioning and rejecting of norms that justify inferior treatment for groups such as the disabled, foreign-language speakers, racial minorities, and women. 79 And she suggests methods of furthering her underlying equality ideal by incorporating difference into the social structur in ways that purge them of hi erarchy.80 For example, she recommends dealing ,vith communication problems bel:\ . . . . een a hearing-impaired child and her hearing classmates by teaching all the children sign language. Such an approach, Minow claims, "would treat the problem of difference as embedded among all the students, making aU of them part of the problem," rather than "assum[ing] that the problem of difference is located in th hearing-impaired child. ~
Rights and Exclusion
Recall the question that prompted this discussion of Professor Minow's view of difference; How does that view differ (if at all) from a liberal view of the relation hip betw n differe nce and equality? The a nswer requires an evaluation of both Minow's critique of liberal-rights analysis and of her affirmative proposals to re place it a. Minow's critique of liberalism. Although Professor Minow acknowledges that liberal rights-based approaches to law can remedy discrimination against some persons, she claims that in the end liberal visions of equality, grounded in the sameness of rationality or autonomy, improperly exclude those who do not possess the requisite degree of these qualities 8l :
De pite its liberatory rhetoric of inclusion and fundamental entitlement, the analysis of rights. developed in constitutional and statutory judicial doctrines in this country, runs aground on the shoals of the two-track system of legal treatme nt. On track offers basic rights to self-dete rmination and participation for tho e who satisfy the criteria of rational thought and independence; the other offers special treaLment and, quite often, social and political exclusion. Those treated as "different ft who can demonstrate that they correctly belong on th first track may find considerable h elp through the rhetoric of rights. hose who fail to satisfy th test of "sameness," however, may find rights analysis a bitter remedy that undermines whatever pas t acknowledgment of difference there had been without producing social and political inclusion . 82 Minow argues that liberal "sameness" assumptions endanger the few special benefits accorded to the historically "different"; 'Thus, efforts to eliminate gender bias in divorce law have removed alimony and child-custody provisions that pre~ rred women, and some observers attribute to these reforms the increased impoverishment and worsened bargaining position of women following divorce. "83 In short, rights-based approaches to law end up reinforcing inequality not only by embracing the legal processes of differ nce-creation e mbodied in the five core assumptions outlin d 81. See, e.g. , Minow, id., supra note 2, at 147 ("Righ ts analysis offers release from hierarchy and subordination to those who can match th e picture of the abstract, autonomOIJS individual presupposed by the theor y of rights. For th ose who do not ma tch that picture, application of rights analysis can be not on ly unresponsive bUl also punitive"). above,84 but also by hiding the continuation of social, political, and legal hierarchy behind the (false) app arance of equal opporlun ity.85 At its core, this critique attacks the liberal assumption that autonomy is a species-wide trait among humans,86 charging that this assum ption illegitimately xcludes some persons. 87 T hus, Minow's fundamental complaint i against liberal equality as justification: She argues thal grounding legal rights in the descriptive samenesses of agency, rationality, or autonomy is wrong because it is exclusion a ry.88 85, See, e, g, , t .Iinow, Making AU the Diff ernue, supra note 2, at 152 ("Pretense of universal , in clusive norms in the public sphere obscures the power of assigned d ifferences in the pli,'ate sphere "); , iii. at 22 3 ('The relational challe nge suggests that [the limits SCI. on responsibi liLies by rights analysis] reflect a particular perspective not because it is correct but beG1USe it expresses the worldview of those who have had sufficient power to shape preva iling social institmions") ; id, at 217 (feminist work has con tributed to the relational project by "recastin g issues of 'di fference' as proble ms of dominatj on or su bordin aLion in order to di sclose the social relatio n ships of power withi n wh ich difierence is named and enforced"); id. at 224 ( ocial relatio ns approach sees " [d ] ifferences that yield social d istance and exclusion. , , as the selfsening expressions of th e more powerful") ; id, at 239 ("Those who \'~n a given struggle for control may have be tter access to the means of producing knowl edge, such as mass media and schools. Such control Illay even shape th e terIllS of access so that exclusions of other points of liew appear neutral, based on merit or on other standards endorsed even by th ose who remain e xcluded") , 86, F..g" id. at 1.55 (criLicizin g as inelitably situated the liberal reliance on noLion of "amonamous, able-bodied " person); id. at 150 ("the heuri tic delice of the soc ial COI1lract presumes to address only autonomous, independent individuals") ; id,at2 16 (chargin g tIl ,1l ri ghts analysis applies only LO tho e who are, or can analogize themselves to , independent persons); id, at 147 ("Righ ts analysis ofiers release from hierarchy and subordination to those who can match tile picture of the abstract, autonomous indilidual presupposed by the theory of rights. 'or tIlOse who do not match that picture, application of lights analysis can be not on I)' unresponsive but also punitive").
87. See, e.g., id, at 152 ("Despite the impl ied aspiraLion to universal inclusion, th e social ContraCl approach has been deeply exclusionar y"); id. at 153 (-rhe presentation ofa type of human being as though it d escribed all human beings risks excludin g any who do not fit or treating such misfits as deliant."); ill, at 154 ("Rawls's differcnce p ri ncip le prc erves too mu ch of th e concept of til e ab tract individual-a con cept that claims but fai ls to secure universality-to respond fully to issues of difference"); id. at 155-56 (''The natural rights u'adition also partakes of the assumpLions of the au tonomo us and abstract ind ividual and excludes or subordinates any who fai l to meet these assumptions"); id, at 156 ('~rh e premise of a basic hum an nature, fo und in the abstract individual capabl e of reaso n , undergirds [natural law] th eory and risks excluding any who do not mee t. it. Theories of natu ral law locate the jusLification for universal rights in human reason or cogniLion, This focus o n reason makes problernaLic any person s who do not manifest to the sa tisfac Lion of tIlOse in charge til e requisite capacities for raLion al though t," and nflering children and th e mCI1laJl y disabl ed as examples of such excluded persons).
88. E.g., id. at 146 ("The 'sameness' between people emphasiled by ri ghL~ analysis challenges special accommodations made for disabl ed pt:ople, wome n , and others h istorically treated as d ifferent"); id, at 152 ("All per,on s are equal because of this Fundamental samen ess-yet th is samen ess seems lO be the emptiness left when we are each sheared of all that makes uS dillere nt"); id, at 223 ("Equating sameness with equality, righ ts analysis oilers a k.ind of certainty and a set of limits: equal treatment, yes, but limited to a eompatison with the other group"); see also Young,jllsliceand lite Politics oiDifference, supra note 2, at17 1 ("In general , then, a relaLionaI understa,nding 01 group differen ce rejects exclusion ").
On Difference and Equality
85
This ~argu ment fro m ex clu s i on~ cannot survive analysis, for at least tv.·o reasons. First, the argume nt rests upon a dramatically impoverished conceptio n of liberalism. Professor Millow writes tha t, d espite its ~ad mira bl e comm itme n t to u niversali ty and inclusion," the [liberal] social comr.J.ct approach has been deeplyexdusionary. It is not only that any sign of diffe rence, any shred of situated perspective, threatens Ule claim to similarity, equality, and identity as an absu'act individual-although these problems are serious enough; it is that this conception amounts to a preference for some points of view oller others; it takes some types of people as the norm and assigns a position of difference to others (thus adopting the assumption s behind the difference dilcmma).89
Although it is true tha t some forms of liberalism re ly on the existen ce of certain th resho ld levels of rationality and/ or autonomy in humans, it is e mphatically not true that ~a n y sign of diffe rence .. , th reatens the clai m to simila ri ty, equali ty, ~ etc., on the liberal view. As the discussion above pointed out, liberalism accommodates a substantial array of difference and that accommod ation is exp/iail)' grounded in the liberal's prior respect fm-fimdamental samene5s. 90 Second, Minow's d e piction of liberal autonomy is fatally shallow. AI various poi n ts she describes autonomy as syno nymo us with be ing ablebodied and wi th physical inde pendence from others, suggesting that the liberal's ~autono m ous~ person must possess not on ly the capacity fo r ratio n al deliberation and ch o ice ma king but also th e abili ty physically to carry o ut those ch o ices. 91 But this vicw relies o n far tOO thin a con ception of autonomous action. c..n Christo ph er Reeve, now a quadriplegic, be said to 89. /d. at 152. 90 . Supra text accompan}1ng notes 14-33. 91. !in. t.g., Min ow, Making All 1M DifftrtllU, supra note 2, at 155 (criticizing rights theory for its "a$SUlllption of an autonomous, able-txxlied perso:m "); id. at 150-51 ("The heurislic deo.ice of th e social contract presumes to address only autonomous, independent individu;ds who can separate themselves from others and enter freel~', unencumbered, into an agreement aboout how (0 conduct pri\"ale and public affairs. .. A very different design for ... conceiving of the foundations of a society would be llecessary in order to include directly those who "1thin contemporary society seem disabled and those h istori cally treated as incompetent and incapa· ble of participating in Ihe formation of a rational consensus").
Other theorists have posited concepts of autonomy that add to rational choice-making power the existence of a sufficient range of options and of the ability to act on one's choices.
!in, t.g., Fallon. rupra note 13, at 886 (offering modified Razian \1sion of autonomy a nd claiming that "descriptive autonomy depends on at least four elements lhat constitute the -conditions of autonoITlY-' (I) cri lical and sclf-critical a bility; (2) competence to aCI; (3) sufficient options; and (4) independence of coercion and manipulation~). Fallon claims that under this conception of autonomy, ")a) physically helpless person, such as a quadriptegic, is not autonomous in important respects." Id. at 888. Once aw.tin, this v;"-w is \lltnerable \0 the charge leveled against Minow-that il rests upon rar 100 sparse a conception of what it means to "acI.-86 CY NTHI A V. W ARD lack a req uisite level of a Ulonomy because he cannot physically do things most oth ers can? Is Reeve, with the mo ney to h ire others to compensate for h is disability, dearl y less a utonomous l ilall , say, a com ple tely impoverished but able-bodied person, or a severely retarded but able-bodied person? or course nOL In fact, liberals have argued for special accommoda tions-such as wheelchair access-for the physically disabled, in rerognition of their possesriM oJ the threshold level oJ autMomy that j ustifi es equal rights a nd responsib ilities. O n any reasona ble theory o f what it means to "act," individua ls do not have to be able-bodied or physically independe nt to be autonomous in the liberal sense; they must simply possess the moral a nd intellectual abili ty to make certai n types of choices about their lives a nd lO make meaningful attem pts, physically or otherwise, lO realize those choices.
Professor Minow is q uite critical of this idea that autonomy is fundame ntally a men tal capacity. For example, she allacks the scholarship of philo sopher David Lam b for "definin g human life in te rms of capaci ty for thought," since Lam b's definiti on "would e xclude persons in a persiste nt vegetative state. "92 Suppose this is correct-that liberal justifica tions of equali ty that are grounded in descriptive assum ptions of human rationality and autonomy do, in fact, "exclude~ those in a persiste nt \'egetative state and perhaps some affiicted by severe me ntal disabilities. 9 .' 1 In this context "exd usi on~ presumably refers to the lack of any equality-based justrfication fo r u'eating such individuals as equals in a liberal society. T hose who lack the requisite level of a utonomy or rationality have no claim to be treated as equals in a regime whose justification of legal eg-dlitarianism is defin ed by those qualities.
At one level this scenario simply highligh ts the limits of equali ty itself as a legal principle. Arguably, the idea of equali ty-however justified and however defin ed-does not work a t all in the context of arguing for be tte r treatment of those whose disabilities have made the m permane ntly in capable not only of autonomous c ho ice making but also of forming relationships, of caring for themselves physically, o r (as in the case of comalOse people) of even kn owing who, or tha t, they are. We might say, for exam ple, that the person in a pe rsiste nt vegetative state has the "right" not to be killed for spon. But is this "'right" an equality-based right? Surely not; the "'right" is grounded not in the equality of the comatose person to the rest of humanity, bm in other reasons-in o ur hope t11at such individuals will someday "wake up," perha ps; or in our compassio n for the m and their fam ilies; or in our 92. Minow, MiU:ing AU 1M DifftmlU, supra note 2, at 152. 93. At times Minow lreaLS ch ildren a lld the memally disabled :u groups excluded by liberalism. But th is is dramatically overreaching. As Minow herself concedes, liberal throry acknowledges the personhood of children as JUrure a utonomous agents. /d. at ]56. And, unless one defines "mental disabili ty· in such a way that il refers to extremely severe psychological or cognitive deficits. it is far too simplistic to assume that all men tally disabled pcr$Ons lack rationality or the capacity to make autonomous choices about their lives.
conviction that allowi ng such killing would lead us to become callous toward greater a trocities. 94 For the purposes of this essay, however, an even more important conclusion follows from Minow's charge that liberal sameness assumptions are unjustly exclusionary. Notice that he r argumem im plies that "true eq u ality~ necessitates treating such people as equals, But that statement itself requires justification. Upon what theory of equality is it based? Two possibi lities ex ist. First, she could be a rgu ing not that sameness-based equal ity is per st' unjust, but that autonomy and rationali ty are sim ply the wrong samenesses upon which to ground assumptions of equal moral worth and legal equali ty. On this theory lhe use of autonomy as equality's core justification is illegitimately exclusionary because ( I ) wha t makes persons equal is really someth ing else-relational ability or em pathy, for example-and (2) this truth has been unjustly quashed by the a utonomy prin ci ple. AI least one advocale for Ihe me ntally d isabled, for example, has a rgued th at assumptions of equality based on the capacity for love, e mpathy, and ~co mmun a lity" ought to replace autonomy-based legal structures that single out the melllally disabled as different and inferior.9 5 But such proposals arc not available eith er to Minow or to other postm odern critics of liberalism, who consistently attack such ideas as "essentialist. ~ On the posunodern view, any assumption of sameness among humans is suspect because it so often leads us to ignore or suppress radical difference. For this reason Martha Minow consistently condem ns sameness-based equality per st', a position that logically com pels her to rejcct proposals that would simply substitute o ne for m of sameness for a nOlhe r.96 Autonomy, connectedness, e mpathic ability--even species membership-are all samenesses that she necessarily rejects as bases for legal equality. So Minow m ust be argu ing that, despite the fact that no sameness can properly ground equality, all persons should nevertheless be treated as eq uals. But the crucial point is this: Minow's critique of sameness-based equality kaves her un'th no ansu..oer to the question o/why "We should treat all persons, including permanently comatost' persons, as equals. 97 If people are radically and irreducibly different, 94. Or perhaps the "right" is ground.,.:! in a I'ery basic principle of "s.lmeness"-that of species membership. But such a principle can only sefve as a very weak justification fOf legal rights. For why ought species membership to justify slIch rights? The f<:adiesl fesponse is phrased in terms of SOIM othrrquality that constitutes the real justification for the right_that the human species shares the capacity for rationality, autonomy. empathy, moral pef~nality, and so on. This takes the argument back to square one.
95. Robert L. Hayman,Jr., Prtsumptians ofjl>sliC'; I.mv, "olilir:s. fInd the fIImtally Rr/tlrriLd I'atml. lOS ~RV. L. REv. 120\ ( 1990) (criticizing autonomy-and rationality-hased presumptions employed in judicial decisions about parenting abilities of mentally handicapped persons. and arguing \113t relational abilities of such persons should form the basis for a new legal standard of evaluation of parenting abilities).
96. Nevertheless. she ultimately tries to go this route, and I evaluate her attempt in tile next section. infra, text accompanying notes 99-116.
97. And a non-sameness--based justification of e<;juality seems entirely unanractive, for rea- what justi fi es legal equaliry? Mi llow ad\'ocatcs "real eq ual ity" through the proper recogn itio n of differe nce; but such hopes are em pty rh c LOric in the a bsence ofsQmc underlyingjustific<lt ion for the declared equality principle. As I argue below,98 eq ualiry cannot be fully j ustified witho ut affirm ing samen ess of some kind-the rejection of sameness, therefore. n ecessaril y im plies the rejection o f any rich theory o f legal equality.
h. M inow's "social relo.tions" approach: back 10 esse1rlialism. Th e discussion thus fa r has revealed core weaknesses in Minow's atLack on li bera l samenessbased eq uality. As a liule renection makes clear, her proposed rqJw.a:mentfor liberal legal structures is even more nawed. In place of conventional civi lrights methodology. which focllses on erasing miscategori zalio ns o f persons as inferior in beh alf of an underlri ng be lief in the rational, autonomous sd fhood o f all human be ings,99 Professor Minow advances a suspicion o f categorization perse. Minow atlem pts to move the inquiry from one involving ~tru e~ and ~false ~ categories to one in\'olving th e dangers of categorization itself:
[T] he social relations app roach assumes that there is a b.1sic connectedness between people, instead of assuming that autonomy is the prior an d essential dimen sion of personhood.
The social relation s approach is dubious of the method o f social organization that constructs human rel~lIionships in te r m s of immutable categories. fixed statuses and inherited or ascribed
Min ow acknowled ges that categorization is necessary, but sh e warns that it o u ght to be p rofoundly m istrusted owing to il~ histo ry of usc for the purpose of creati ng power inequities.
Via her ~soc ial re l ation s~ approach to difference, Mi now seeks both to acknowledge social categories and to re nder them powerless. Her proposal contains several key e lemen ts. First, it d e picts difference as hie rarchical and urges that prevailing social norms be exposed as simply th e poi n l~ of view of the powerful and thereby robbed of thei r natural, intrinsic, and stable auras. WI For Minow the key question to consider in evaluat ing the legal response to an alleged difference is wh ether and how it affects human relationships:
The per Sf, that this ncw sameness should replace autonomy and rationality as thc proper j ustifi cation of equal ity? Ifso, Minow's social relations approach raises the vcry same proble m of exclusion that prompted he r attacks on liberal ism. Second, the social relations approach relies heavily on the fac ul ty of empath), as a way of produci ng discussions about difference bet ..... een the powerful and the dominated. Professor Minow writes that the social relations theofY is rooted in "learning to take the perspective ofanother,H and she presents it as "an openi ng wed ge for an alterna tive to traditional legal treaunents of difference."103 By ta lki ng a nd listening to others who are different, those in power will come to realize that ~di ffe fe nce~ is relational and debatabl e-lhat the hearing children in a classroom a re as different from thei r deaf classmate as she is from them-a nd that issues of difference thus necessari l)' place both the ~nor mal " and the '"different" person in relationship to each other. Th us, Minow makes empathy, particularly judicial em pa thy, in to the chief means of moving society from the status quo, which she depicts as illegitima tely individualist and eli list, toward a greater focus upon the im portance of connectedness and relationshi ps.IO-I She hopes that such em pathic perspective-laking wi ll help reconceive rights, preserving the ir liberating potential while grounding them not in rationality o r autonomy but in con ncCledness and the recognition of untranscendable perspective. lOr.
Th e usc of em pathy, or ~perspecti\'e t3king," as a means of im proving liberal ism is hardly new. Communilarians and relationa l feminists see p0-litical empathy as central to the effective replacement of liberal legalism with more communa l, mutually interde pendent, a nd altruistic legal SlrUClures. 106 To the extent these proposals express the view tha t we should all be nicer and more understanding of each o ther, they clearly have merit. But the atlempt to deploy empathy as a new basis for legal decision making will fail-and rightly so.
Empathy can be understood in two ways-as the imagined projection of one's ~selJ into the person of another, or as an auempt to understand the o ther as essen tially different, without trying to fuse o ne's identity with the other's or to assume a basic sam e ness of ~selr between e mpathize r and the other, The first understanding, which I have called ~projec tive empathy,"107 is not me rely consistent with liberalism; it is the foundation of liberal progress toward the realization of equa l rights for aJI.l08 Projective em pathy relies, in essential part, on the realization th at despite our differences, I and the object of my empathic atle ntion are the same and therefore eq ual. This view of em pathy may, in fact, have motivated the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Educalion,l09 the most famous American civil-rights case. 110 It is a view of pe rspective-taking that would be unacceptable to Professor Minow, who repeatedly rejects the liberal no tio n that equality ought to be based on sameness. lll She must rely, therefore, on a second vision of em pathy, which I have called "imagina ti\'e e mpathy. ~112 This understanding of e mpathr acknowledges radical diversi ty-that e mpathizer and other are ineradicably different and separa te-but nevertheless assumes that it is possible at least partially to understand the other despite his or her difference. Imaginative empathy therefore recognizes diversity and may escape reliance on sameness-but, I have a rgued, loses any in nate connection with equali ty.1l3 While projective e mpathy sus through difference to find equality, imaginative empatlly stops at the point of acknowledging and appreciating difference, thereby losing any innate connection to equality.114 The point should be clear: Liberalism incorporates an equality-friendly understanding of e mpathy that is rooted in sameness, whereas nonliberal empathy stands in direct tension with equali ty. Professor Minow's social relations approach must fa il because its core premise. that empathic "perspective taking" can simultaneously transcend sameness and embrace equality, is false.
c. The emptiness of the postmodern vision of difference. I n sum, neither Minow's critical a ttacks on liberalism nor her affirmative proposals to replace it can survive careful analysis. Her critique of liberal rights theories reduces to one claim : That such theories improperly rely on the concept of au tonomy to justify equal a nd individual rights. Minow argues that this reliance is wrong because it excludes some persons from being treated as equals, resulting in the label ing of such individuals as "different" and inferior. But her narrow depiction of the foundations of liberal though t, coupled with her failure to otTer an equali ty-based justification for her universal inclusion principle, leaves this critique com ple tely undefended.
Minow's affirmative argument for the "social relations approach~ not only raises the spectre of essentialism-which she elsewhere fi rmly and repeatedly repudiates ll L-but also relies heavily on a difference-based concept of empathy that is actually antieq uality. Two premises form the core of the social relations approach: First, sameness-based theories of equality are wrong because they label some persons as different and inferior; second, our shared human capacity for e mpathic dialogue can lead us to real equality. But to the extent it is rooted in the rejection of sameness, Minow's theory fights with equality; and insofar as she introduces a new sameness, the sameness of e mpathic a bility, as the proper basis for rights and legal categories, Minow-like comm unitarians and relational feminists-simply deploys the notion of difference as a stalking horse for her own particular brand of same ness-based equality.116 
IV. DIFFERENCE AS EQUALITY
It would seem from the above a nalysis that diffe rence-based attacks on liberalism necessarily confl ict with eq uality. But this conclusion may be 100 hasty, for a third conception of differcnce--one that departs in importalll ways from th e views d iscussed thus fa r-now dominates the literature in cri tical race theory. In this section I consider whether this view of difference is any more equality-friendly than its counterparts.
A. Difference in Critical Race Theory
Advocates of this tllird vision of d ifference share much wi th advocates of poslmoclern difference theory. In particular, they accept the social<on-suuction explanation for the origin of difference, and they are even more open than is Martha Minow about the connection between difference and hierarchy.!17 Difference, on this view, is the deliberate assignmen t of inferiority, most promine ntly racial inferiority, by the white m.yority to racial minorities. IIS Schola rs who adopt this view insist that we must recognize and institutionalizc, via the establishment of affirmalive group righlS, group differcnces that originated in racial oppression,I19
At th e root of th eir proposed "politics of difference "120 is th idea that disadvantaged groups-most prominently racial minorities-have developed distinct methods of viewing the world and functioning within it that, as a matter of justice to those groups, must be preserved via the explicit importation into law of group rights and special treatment. 121 The goal is to promote eguality1 22-an equality based not on sameness, as in the liberal r ubric, but on racial differences. As critical-race theorist AngeJa Harris puts it, "This claim to equality based not on sameness but rather on difference is at th e heart of th politics of diffe rence. "123
On a critical-race-theory view, Martha Minow's concern fo r the dangers of categorization actually overlooks the positive aspects of difference for those groups that have been marginalized. According to Sheila Foster, for exam pI , the danger of Minow's approach is that "Min ow leaves the power of transformation, this tim with respec t to creating identities, in the ha nds of those already in power. "124 Foster argues that Minow's ocial relations theory constitutes an appeal to the already powerful to listen to the perspectives of the marginalized , while Foster urges more action by the latter themselves to control th e meaning and consequences of difference 125 :
Categori zation ... has been and continues to be a means by which those marginalized groups can empow r themselves by redefining the assigned meaning of difference. Categories, like rights, need to be rescued to allow those marginalized by essentialist categorization to empower themselves by altering, for themselves, the meaning of categories of difference imposed on them by those in power .... Marginalized groups can rescue categori es by claiming those cat gories and by transforming negative meanings associated with th m in to positive ones that they create. The empowerment in this process of transformation comes not only in protesting the assigned meanings of a cat gorical difference, but also in the recognition of the power to detlne th at difference for th community of individuals embracing the diIIerence. 126
Condemning Minow's "seemin g willingness to get rid of categories altogether"127 and h er "placement of the power of transformation in th e hands ofth powerful, "128 Foster concludes that a universal c<?mmunity built upon J 20. T These ideas may have much political ulility1 42; the effort here is to isolate and ana lyze the co ncept of differe nce they employ. Two fundamental as ·er-tions lie at its base . First, critical-race theo rists urge groups that have been assigned th e label "differe nt" a5 a badge of inferiority to emlJrace that difference in order to "reclaim " it. 143 Second, th eir goal appears to be to craft racial equality from such differe nce, to build a "politi cs of difference" that, grounded in the group 's intemalsameness of shared oppression, takes racial equali ty to be its foundational goal.
Sameness from Dif f erence?
To reclaim difference in the name of equality, when dif~ rence has meant inequali ty, is to embrace an internal tension. But, consistent with the postmode rn conviction that individual character and pe rsonali ty are socially constructed, this th eory of difference proposes to resolve that tension by giving the power to transform the meaning of difference to those who have been labeled inferior. On this view reclaiming difference means both acknowledging the negative impact of socially assigned difference on th e members of disadvantaged groups, and transfo rming th e negative content of the "diffe rence" label into an affirmation of group ide ntity and group-based politi S.144
This view is in some meaningful way antiliberal; it views liberal individualism and individual rights as masks fo r white domina tion of minoritie , while it celebrates the lib rating potential of gro up identity and group rights. It also deep ns th conception of group id ntity beyond that contained in liberal pluralism, which envisions "interest groups" that are constructed by preform ed individuals who engage in collective behavior only as a result of preexisting, di tinct int rests that happen to coincide. 145 The "di£ference"-based view in ists on the primacy of group identity as a fac tor in constructing individual identity, and on th importance of membership in societally powerful groups. 146 Upon examination, how ver, this third view of difference collapses of its own weight. Consider first that the acquisition of the powe r to transform meaning must be justified by a purpose other than (or at least in addition to) the mere effects of power-holding. The CRT conception of difference focuses upon the raw experience of power as transformative, but doe n't itself answer the central question of what values that power will serve. Toward what end, in other words, do differ nce advocates argue for the reclamation and reinforcement of diff rence via the simultaneous transformation of its content into a positive one? If CRT theod ts were asked to state th e purpose of the "politics of difference," they would surely answer "the a hi evement of racial justice." And what constitutes racial ju tice? The usual an wer i , "equality between the races. "147 The new and tran formed content of difference is meant, perhaps, to give positive meaning to th phrase" parate but equal"-to affirm the equality of groups whose relation hip ha lon g been that of oppressor and oppressed but which are now to be treated as simply 146. See, e.g., Foster, Difference and F.qllaMv, slIpra note 2, a 158-59 ("The dominant culture has exerci8ed its power to develop social and cultural defmitions for those deemed o utside of that culture. Conseq uently, th e story of Blacks and other minorities has been created and told primarily by "/hites, with little contribu tion from tlle su bjects tllemsclvcs. Blacks an d other minotities have been effectively rendered 'invisi bl e' not because Whites can not see them, but because 'whi tes see primali ly what a white dominant culrure has train d them to see' and because the Black stories ' simply do not register ' ''); Kenn edy, supra note 11 7, a t 722 ("An important hum an reality is the experience of defining oneself as 'a member of a group' in this sO'ong sense of sharing goals and a discu rsive practice''); id. at 723 ("Communitie have cultures. T his means that indi,iduals have traiLS lhat are neither geneti ally d termined nOr volun tarily chosen, b ut rather consciously and unconsciously taugh t through commu nit), life. Communi t), life forms customs and habi ts, capacities to produce li nguistic a nd o th er performances, and individual understandings f good and bad, true and false, worthy and unworthy"); Yo ung, iustice and the Politics of Difference, SlI/Jra note 2, a t 163 ('"Today and for the foreseeable futu re societies are certai nly structured by groups, and some are p ri\~leged wh il others are oppressed") .
147. But see Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363, 373-74 (1992) (argu ing that African Americans should abando n quest for racial eq ua li t), and focus on bettering th eir situation in society); Derrick Bell , f ACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: T HE PERMANENCE OF R ACISM 12 (1992) ("Blac k people will never gain equ ali ty in this country") (emphasis o mitled)_ different from, but nev rtheless equal to, each other. But "equal" in what sense? The creation of group-defining "sam ness" from shared oppression-or from cultural traditions that originated in shared oppression-actually ' relies upon the ontinuing existence of difference between groups. Difference from the other becomes the basis for sameness within the group, for the very definition of the group as a group.
On what basis, th n, can group A argue that its memb rs should be treated equally to group B? Group definitions that rely upon the shared "difference" of oppres ion might create community and a sense of equali ty within a group, but cannot justify the establishment of equality between group. If the goal is to win equality for one's group vis-a.-vis all other groups in society, some other justification of the intergroup equality principle must be advanced. 148 I submit that this justification can only be grounded in ameness-not only the samenes of group members to each other, but the sameness of all groups to all oth er groups, or in other words, the sameness of all human beings.
Can Equalil)1 Be Based on Difference?
At one level th critical-race view of difference simply constitutes an argument for a distributive principle of equality. Difference theorists argue for equal distribution of resources and power to groups whose subordination previously compris d the steps in th e social ladd r. Once again, however, this principle of distribution must b justified at a deeper level-must answer the question of why we sh ould distribute power equally.
At the level of justification this strain of difference theory is incoherent. CRT scholars reject the liberal idea thal rationali ty and autonomy are the proper bases on which to construct legal rights, arguing either that thos ideas are innately biased in favor of the white male elite and designed to perpetuate its dominanc , or that autonomy and rationality are epheme ral to start with. Instead, radical theorists argue for equality based on difference, I< 19 and although this might work at the distributiv level-it is at least theoretically possible to d cide which "differences" have created relevant groups and to distribut money, j obs, and/or political positions equally among all groups deemed r I vant by the agreed-upon criteria of difference-it is completely unintelligible at the justifi atory level, a fault that leaves difference theory without any equality-based answer to th question 148. Relalional feminiSl lheory also faces this problem. Some of Robin 'West\ work , for e ample, suggests lhat women are profoundl y different from men al. every level. See, e,g., WeSl. ;ulna note I , al 17 ("According to the vasllile,"alure on d ifference now being developed by cu ltura l fem inists, women's cognitive de,'elopmenl, literary sensibility, aesthetic tasle, and psychological development, no less than our analomy, are all fundame ntally different from men ·s. , ., The most signifi calll aspecl of our difference, though, is surely Lh<: moral differenc<:"), If Lhis i true, women 's equalilY lO men (ralhe r than preferential or inferior treatment) requ ires an independ ent argumenl showing why women, although so very different, nevertheless possess eq ual worlh.
149, See, e.g" Harris, supra note 2, at 761, of why we should di tribute power equalJy a mong racial groups. To the extent difference theory demonstrates the existence of radical, irr ducible diffe renc among groups, it undercuts th justification for working toward equali ty for those groups. Why, in hort, should we treat people as equals if they in fact are irreducibly diffe rent? At the very least, an a nswer to this question requires an analysis of what differe nc s exist between gro up and some conclusion th at, alth ough differen t, the groups' values, identities, purposes, etc., are neverthe less equal. 0 such discussion appears in radical differen ce theory.
Equalit)1 without Sameness?
There are of course justifications for political principles of eq ual distribution that do not rely on the establishm e nt of sameness among all persons. One could argue, for example, that treating people as equal is necessary to preserve law and order, or to maximize h appiness or minimize suffering-a utilitarian view. But such justifications capture neith r th spirit nor the pronounced beliefs of radical difference theo ry. The p ace-and-order rationale is both e mpirically dubiou -law and orde r have been pre erved for long periods in hi e rarchical socie ties and dramatically violated in egalitarian ones-and politically uninspiring. It shrinks discussions about the proper vision of social justice into squabbles over the com parative virtues of various bureaucratic peacekeeping stra tegie . At I ast some utilitarian views may b similarly limited, as critical-race theorist Derrick Bell 's writings ill ustrate. O n a straightforward reading of Profe or Bell 's work, one could reasonably conclude that a uti litarian approach to racial justice would result in the re te ntion ofa rigid racial hie rarchy in the Un ited States. Bell believes that subordinating blacks is an esse nti al part of the white majority's identity in this country, and in fact that whites have such a strong preference in favor of oppressing blacks tha t they will never allow racial hierarchy to end. 150 If this is correct, calls for racial justice rely at their pe ril on utilitarian rationales.
V. CONCLUSION: DIFFERENCE AND DOUBLESPEAK
It would seem that any acceptable justification of eq uali ty requir the establishment of orne descriptive same ness among people. t the moment one asserts that rw important commonali ty of persons can be established or 150. Seegenerally Be ll . Racial Realisl1~ supra nOle 147; Bell, FACES AT THE BoTTOM O'-THE Wtl.L, supra n Ole 147; see al50 Brooks and ewborn, supra nOle 119, al 798 (ra ism is "normal science" in th e U nited States); H arri s, s!ll;ra nOle 2, at 749 ("Derric k Bell argues lhal racism is a permanent feature of lh e American landscape, not somelhing we can Lhrow off in a magic moment of emanci pation . And in a mom ent of deep pessimism, Ri chard Delgado's fictional fd end 'Rodrigo Cren shaw ' has suggesL ed lhal racism is an inuinsic reatu re or lhe 'The Enligille nme nt' iLSeir-) (citations omitted).
can legitimately form the basis of citizenship, one is left without a rich defense of egalitarianism. The assault on "equality as sameness" must take onc of two routes. Either its consists of a charge that the wrong sameness has grounded politics and law, or it implies the rejection of equality altogether. Tn the first instance, difference theorists are left to find and defend some new commonality (a task they have so far rejected as "essentialist") 15 1, in which case the current focus on the "difference" question ought to be transcended in favor of an open debate over which vision of equality is the best. In the second instance, difference advocates are left to discover an entirely new, nonequality-based structure for law and politics. If political and legal equality are not proper goals given the "differcnce" critique, what should be our goals? In the name of what principle should we worry about differences in power between the races and genders? In an environment of irreconcilable "difference," how should we make justice-based arguments for change, or even think about justice itself? Scholars who deploy radical views of difference in order to argue for social justice must bear the burden of answering these questions.
